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STUDENT NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-THE RIGHT OF A
MARRIED WOMAN TO RETAIN HER MAIDEN
NAME
In light of the growing concern for women's rights in recent
years, the historical aspects of some present-day legal and social
assumptions and customs need to be re-examined to determine
just exactly what those rights are and upon what foundation they
rest. Such a re-examination should begin with an inquiry into the
question of whether a woman must assume her husband's surname
upon marriage. Since most women choose to assume their hus-
bands' surnames, the significance of this issue may be overlooked;
but, recognition of legislation controlling discriminatory practices
in employment, female career-mindedness, and the proposed equal
rights amendment' suggests the magnitude of the problem. An
analysis of the historical roots of the practice of adopting marital
surnames should indicate that such practice is no longer mandated
by existing law.
I. SURNAMES GENERALLY
From before the eleventh century in England until about the
time of the Norman Conquest, there was no such thing as a sur-
name; 2 each person was identified only by his Christian name.
With an increase in population, however, the adoption of surnames
became an acceptable means of less-confused identification, al-
though such practice was not prevalent until the middle of the
fourteenth century. 3 Since names were used primarily for identifi-
cation, a man was generally known by the name of his estate or
the place where he was born. Often, the occupation became the
surname; for example, John the Smith became John Smith.
Among other groups of people, a physical characteristic or some
personal attribute gave rise to a surname; for example, Little,
Moody, or Whitehair. A son was distinguished from his father by
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
See Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859); Arnold, Personal
Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227 (1905); Note, The Right of a Married Woman to Use Her
Birth-Given Surname for Voter Registration, 32 MD. L. REV. 409 (1973).
' Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 568 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859).
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adding "son" as a suffix to the father's Christian name; thus, Paul,
Robert's son, was abridged to Paul Robertson. The Normans added
"Fitz" to the father's name to designate the son; for example,
Fitzsimon. The Celts of Ireland and Scotland distinguished the son
with "Mac" and the grandson with "0" which resulted in such
surnames as MacHenry and O'Henry.'
Although statutes were adopted in 1465 in England requiring
the use of surnames, each member of the family group did not
necessarily bear the same surname. Not until the reign of Henry
VIII did the use of hereditary family names become widespread
due to a requirement that full names, including surnames, be re-
corded at birth, marriage, and death.' Still there was no law requir-
ing that a certain surname be taken or that all family members
adopt the same name. Nor was there a law prohibiting a man from
adopting as many surnames during the course of his lifetime as he
chose.' Therefore, the custom of a woman taking her husband's
name, and the husband's name thus becoming the family name,
"was brought about without any positive provision of law."' Re-
sponsibility for the emergence of this custom most probably rests
with the common law fiction that since the husband and wife were
one, and the one was the husband,' then "a single name should
designate this unit, the name of the husband." 9
Today, most authorities are quick to point out that at common
law a woman's change of name upon marriage was acquired by
repute.'0 Any name could be adopted as a legal name for any non-
Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tenn. 1975).
Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 571 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859); E. SMITH, THE STORY
OF OUR NAMES 39 (1970). See also W. BowMAN, THE STORY OF SURNAMES (1973).
1 "It is universally recognized that a person may adopt any name he may
choose so long as such change is not made for fraudulent purposes." Pierce v.
Brushart, 153 Ohio St. 372, 380, 92 N.E.2d 4, 8 (1950). "If there is no statute to
the contrary, a person may adopt any name by which he may become known, and
by which he may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued."
Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 597, 16 A.2d 642, 646 (1940). "Where a person is as
well known by one name as by another, the use of either is sufficient." Gillespie v.
Rogers, 146 Mass. 610, 16 N.E. 711 (1888).
Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 571 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859).
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (B. Gavit ed. 1941).
Comment, Married Woman's Right to Her Maiden Name: The Possibilities
for Change, 23 BUFF. L. REv. 243, 245 (1973).
0 "When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does in
England, the surname of her husband in substitution for her father's
name, it may be said that she acquires a new name by repute. The change
2
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fraudulent purpose provided that it actually identified the person
using it." Although the practice of a woman taking the husband's
name became deeply embedded in custom and tradition, there was
no English law requiring it. Indeed, there were numerous examples
of a man taking his wife's surname, especially if an inheritance was
through the wife's family. Nor was it uncommon for children to
assume their mother's birth name if she were prominent. 12
The custom of male predominance came to America along
with many other English traditions, and consequently, women
today generally assume their husbands' surnames upon marriage.
Many jurisdictions, however, have erroneously interpreted the
English tradition as a rule of law rather than as an optional cus-
tom.,3
I1. CASE LAW
The confusion surrounding married women's surnames stems
primarily from the case of Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank4
in which the court stated:
of name is in fact, rather than in law, a consequence of the marriage.
Having assumed her husband's name she retains it, notwithstanding the
dissolution of the marriage by decree of divorce or nullity, unless she
chooses thereupon to resume .her maiden name or acquires another name
by reputation. On her second marriage there is nothing in point of law to
prevent her from retaining her first husband's name." 19 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1350 at 829 (3rd ed. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
"In England, custom has long since ordained that a married woman takes her
husband's name. This practice is not invariable; nor compellable by law .. " M.
TURNER-SAMUELS, THE LAW OF MARIED WOMEN 345 (1957).
""[A name] derives its whole significance from the fact that it is the mark or
indicia by which [a person] is known." Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 568 (N.Y. Ct.
C.P. 1859).
22 Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
779, 781.
' See note 19 infra.
85 N.Y. 437 (1881). Verina Chapman, a married teacher from South Caro-
lina, held eighty-four shares of stock in a New York bank which she had purchased
under her maiden name. During the Civil War she was charged with being a rebel,
a confederate officer, a judge, and a member of Congress of the Confederacy. An
action was brought under the Confiscation Act of 1862 to confiscate her bank
shares. Notice of the pending action was posted under her maiden name of Verina
Moore. Because she failed to file an answer, confiscation was effected by default.
The New York court held that no person named Verina Moore existed after the
marriage, and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction over the action.
[Vol. 79
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"For several centuries, by the common law among all
English-speaking people, a woman upon her marriage takes her
husband's surname. That becomes her legal name, and she
ceases to be known by her maiden name. By that name she
must sue and be sued, make and take grants and execute all
legal documents. Her maiden surname is absolutely lost, and
she ceases to be known thereby."' 5
Although this principle clearly produced a just result in the
Chapman case, "it was plain error in respect to 'centuries' of com-
mon law."' 6 The King v. Inhabitants of St. Faith's Newton,'7 an
English case decided sixty years before Chapman, held that there
is nothing to compel a woman to adopt her husband's surname.
Although in dicta, the court stated:
"It has been asserted in argument, that a married woman
cannot legally bear any other name than that which she has
acquired in wedlock; but the fact is not so; a married woman
may legally bear a different name from her husband, and very
many living instances might be quoted in proof of the fact."'"
Interestingly enough, virtually all of the cases holding that a
woman automatically changes her name upon marriage cite
Chapman as supporting authority,'" yet the Chapman principle
itself is not derived from any authority.2 As a result, in jurisdic-
tions now recognizing mandatory name change upon marriage, the
precedent relied upon is a single case, decided nearly a century
ago, which misinterpreted the common law.
2
'
1 Id. at 449 (Emphasis added.) The court cited no authority for this proposi-
tion.
.8 Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 144, 226 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1975). See note
11 supra.
,1 3 Dowling & Ryland's Reports 348 (1823). Reported in 16 Eng. Common Law
Rep. 171 (1830).
"1 Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 144, 226 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1975), quoting 3
Dowling & Ryland's Reports 348, 352 (1823).
11 In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,
327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945); Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 256 Mass.
30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
2 See note 15 supra; cf. 57 Am. JUR. 2D Names § 9 (1971).
21 It should be noted that Chapman no longer has precedential value in New
York in light of Application of Halligan, 46 App. Div. 2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1974). Without reference to Chapman, a unanimous court held that a married
woman had a right to be known by her maiden name and by no other name, despite
the marriage. "Under common law the change [upon marriage] is accomplished
by usage or habit." Id. at 459.
4
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The next case after Chapman to confront squarely the issue
of whether the common law operates to change a woman's name
was People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky.? Ms. Rago, a woman who had
not changed her name upon marriage, brought a writ of mandamus
to force the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners to reinstate
her voter's registration under her maiden name. An Illinois statute
provided that a "registered voter who changes his or her name by
marriage or otherwise, shall be required to register anew and au-
thorize the cancellation of the previous registration .. "23 The
court referred to the "long-established custom, policy and rule of
common law . . whereby a woman's name is changed by mar-
riage and her husband's surname becomes as a matter of law her
surname."24 It is doubtful that Lipsky will be followed in the future
as it has been criticized on several grounds.2 First, the cases cited
in support of the proposition that a woman must assume her hus-
band's surname do not rely upon any authority in stating that it
is a mandatory requirement; rather they recognize the practice as
immemorial custom and tradition, but not one compellable by
law . 2 Second, the Illinois statute which required re-registration
presumed'that a woman would change her name upon marriage.
Such a presumption is rebuttable, and if so rebutted, the purpose
of the statute would be carried out by allowing a married woman
to maintain her maiden name on the registration rolls since, in
fact, there would have been no change of nameY Third, the court
allowed Ms. Rago to continue using her maiden name profession-
ally which emphasizes the fallaciousness of the court's holding.
Thus, in an attempt to discourage confusion and fraud, the court
actually encouraged it by allowing continued use of a maiden name
for some purposes but not for others.2
The major case cited in opposition to Chapman and Lipsky is
State ex rel. Krupa v. Green.2 1 Pursuant to an antenuptial agree-
ment with her husband, a woman retained her maiden name after
2 327 11. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
23 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 6-54 (Smith-Hurd 1965). West Virginia has a similar
statute: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-2-28 (1966).
24 327 I1. App. at 70, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
779, 791-92.
2a Id.
2Id.
'Id.
114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
[Vol. 79
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marriage and placed that name on a ballot for the office of munici-
pal court judge. She had used her maiden name for all public
purposes" and had voted for three years subsequent to the mar-
riage under that name. The Ohio court allowed the use of the
woman's maiden surname for her candidacy, recognizing that the
state of Ohio follows the custom of a woman adopting her hus-
band's surname upon marriage, but stating that "there exists no
law compelling it."'3
Two recent cases directly on point seem to have settled the
question in Wisconsin and Tennessee and also indicate a trend
away from Chapman. In these two cases, Kruzel v. Podel132 and
Dunn v. Palermo,33 both courts disregarded the American perver-
sion of the English common law holding that "a woman upon
marriage adopts the surname of her husband by thereafter custom-
" This article does not deal with the legal problems that might arise should a
married woman, who had assumed and used her husband's surname, seek to change
that married name and resume her maiden name. It deals only with the original
retention of a maiden name upon marriage where the woman in no way adopts her
husband's surname, nor relinquishes the right to use her own.
11 114 Ohio App. at 501, 177 N.E.2d at 619; accord, Custer v. Bonadies, 30
Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (1974); Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,
266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972), noted in 32 MD. L. REv. 409 (1973).
32 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). Rose Kruzel, a married woman who
had consistently and exclusively used her maiden name, petitioned the court to
legally change her name back to her maiden name so she would be eligible for group
insurance through the Milwaukee School Board under that name. Although no one
testified in opposition to the name change, the trial judge rejected the petition on
the ground that such a change would not be in the best interest of any children that
might be born to the marriage. However, on appeal the court held that the common
law does not require a woman's surname to change when she marries unless she
acquiesces in such change and there is actual user. A well-reasoned dissent by
Justice Hansen disapproved of the majority's new "habitual user" test stating that
it replaced the "either-or" test approved in Lane v. Duchac, 73 Wis. 646, 41 N.W.
962 (1889). The "either-or" test allowed a married woman to use either her maiden
name, or her married name, or both, whereas the holding in Kruzel forces her to
use one or the other exclusively. Justice Hansen also objected to the effect the
majority holding might have upon the stability of the family unit. 67 Wis. 2d at
158, 226 N.W.2d at 468 (dissenting opinion).
" 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975). Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married
in 1973 but continued to use her maiden name professionally and socially. Due to
Tennessee's compulsory registration law, she notified the registrar of her marriage
and was advised that she must re-register under the surname of her husband or her
name would be removed from the registration records. The court held that "a
woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice. She may elect to retain her own
surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband. The choice is hers." Id. at
688.
6
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arily using that name, but no law requires that she do so. If she
continues to use her antenuptial surname, her name is unchanged
by the fact that marriage has occurred."34 After an exhaustive
discussion of English common law and relevant state statutes,
both courts concluded that the confusion in this area is due to a
misstatement of precedent which has transformed a custom into a
mandatory requirement in other jurisdictions.'- After admitting
that there is currently a division of authority among the fifty states
as to a married woman's right to retain her maiden name, the
Dunn court declared that even if the common law effected an
automatic name change upon marriage, there is nothing to prevent
a departure from the rigid rule where "the reason for the common
law rule does not exist."3 In light of the rapidly expanding field of
human liberties, this may well be a prediction of what other courts
will do when faced with this issue.
III. THE ROLE OF STATUTES
Much of the litigation that arises when a married woman
chooses to retain her maiden name is due to state statutes and
regulations which deprive her of certain rights or privileges if she
fails to adopt her husband's surname. "Women who continue to
use their maiden names after marriage may encounter resistance
from the Internal Revenue Service, voting registrars, motor vehi-
cles departments, or any number of non-governmental sourqes."1
Much of this resistance is due to legislation or administrative regu-
lations requiring a woman to procure a driver's license in her mar-
ried name," to register her vehicle under her married name," or to
register to vote under that name." Several jurisdictions have re-
examined these statutes to determine their constitutionality,4' al-
3, 226 N.W.2d 458, 459; 522 S.W.2d 679, 687.
226 N.W.2d at 461-62; 522 S.W.2d at 687-88.
31 522 S.W.2d at 688, quoting Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 78, 332 S.W.2d
166, 169 (1960).
3 Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 940 (1971).
3' MD. ANN. CODE art. 662 § 6-116 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.22 (1971);
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970
(1972).
3' Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-2-28 (1971 Replacement Volume); People ex rel. Rago
v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945). See text accompanying notes 22
to 28 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 53 to 70 infra.
[Vol. 79
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though most courts have resolved any conflicts involved in the
litigation without reaching the constitutional issues."
Although state statutes vary considerably, a few will be men-
tioned to illustrate the various ways in which state legislatures
have attempted to deal with problems concerning retention of
maiden names. 3 It should be noted that the only jurisdiction in the
United States that had enacted a statute requiring a change of
name upon marriage was Hawaii. However, in 1976, Hawaii
amended that statute to allow each spouse to chose the surname
he or she will use as a married person." The other fifty jurisdic-
tions45 continue to rely upon English common law which enables a
woman by custom to assume her husband's surname as her own
without formal court proceedings.4" Also, every state has some sta-
tutory procedure for effecting a change of name." One state re-
quires the use of the prefix "Miss" or "Mrs." at elections. 8 Finally,
at least thirty-five states allow the wife, under certain conditions,
to resume use of her maiden name after divorce.49 If any conditions
at all are imposed, they generally prohibit name change where
children are born to the marriage 9 or where the wife receives ali-
mony.5 '
Because the case law and the statutory law in some jurisdic-
tions support the idea that a woman must adopt her husband's
surname thus taking away the common law option and making
such assumption mandatory, the constitutionality of such a prac-
tice warrants discussion.
' E.g., Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975).
,3 See generally Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 809-19, for a compilation of relevant state statutes touching on
the topic of name change.
" HAWAII REV. STAT. § 574-1 (Supp. 1975), amending HAWAII REV. STAT. § 574-
1(1968).
'5 The fifty-one jurisdictions described in this analysis include the fifty Ameri-
can states plus the District of Columbia.
,1 See Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910).
17 A few state statutes exclusively provide that a formal court action is the only
way to effect a name change. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.10 (Cum. Supp. 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 1-6 (1964).
" ARK. CONST. amend. 51 § 6(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
See generally Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 809-19.
,a ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1216 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-23 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.20 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
5, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.20 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
8
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The constitutionality of a mandatory change of name by oper-
ation of law was first raised in Forbush v. Wallace.52 In that case,
a married woman brought a class action challenging an unwritten
regulation of the Alabama Department of Public Safety which
required that a married woman acquire a driver's license in her
husband's surname. The court was forced to reach the constitu-
tional issue because the woman stipulated that Alabama's com-
mon law required the wife to adopt the surname of her husband.
In deciding that the regulation did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court found a rational
basis for the regulation claiming that it was necessary for adminis-
trative convenience.53 In explanation, the court stated: "The exist-
ing law in Alabama which requires a woman to assume her hus-
band's surname upon marriage has a rational basis and seeks to
control an area where the state has a legitimate interest."5 The
court also noted that "administrative convenience, if not a neces-
sity, is an important consideration." 5
It is easy to see that the state has a legitimate interest in
preventing fraud in motor vehicle registration and, through its
police powers, an interest in preventing individuals from fraudu-
lently misrepresenting themselves. The question thus becomes
whether these interests are served by requiring that married
women adopt their husbands' surnames. Arguably, the answer is
"no." Logically, the administrative convenience rationale would
support women keeping, rather than abandoning, their birth-given
names for all purposes unless their names were changed by judicial
action. This method would be less confusing as there would be less
administrative paperwork. Further, the chances for fraud would be
reduced as each married woman would have only one name on file
throughout her life. Although the Forbush court, a three-judge
panel, was convinced that a rational basis existed, later courts
have developed higher standards for determining whether there is
a rational basis and have done away with the administrative con-
venience test.56
52 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
s Id.
5 Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 222.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
[Vol. 79
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The major line of constitutional attack upon a mandatory
change of name is that it amounts to discrimination based on sex
since a woman is required to change her name upon marriage and
a man is not.-" "Under 'traditional' equal protection analysis, a
legislative classification must be sustained unless it is 'patently
arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental interest." 58 Applying this test, sex-based classifications
were consistently upheld59 since the presumption was in favor of
the validity of the statute or classification, and any challenge to
that validity had to establish arbitrariness. The standard of review
urged by opponents of mandatory name change is the "compelling
state interest" test." Under this test, if a statute creates a classifi-
cation that is "suspect" or interferes with a "fundamental" right,
it will not be upheld absent a showing of a compelling state inter-
est.' However, rather than abandoning the rational basis test, the
United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,"2 adopted a stricter
standard of review than rational basis, but falling short of a com-
pelling state interest. It emerged as the "fair and substantial"
test.63 "A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation. . . ."" It appears
that under this standard, the statutory classification is presumed
to be invalid with the burden on the state to prove the statute's
validity.
Finally, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court in a plural-
ity opinion declared that "classifications based on sex, like classifi-
" Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (1974).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973), citing Jefferson v. Hack-
ney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
11 E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). "The fact that women may now
have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now
indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between the sexes .... The Constitution does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards .... Id. at
466.
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
"* See note 60 supra.
12 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
'3Id. at 76.
91 Id.
10
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cations based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inher-
ently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny." 5 In Frontiero v. Richardson," a married female Air
Force officer challenged a statute which allowed male members of
the Air Force to declare their spouses as dependents for purposes
of obtaining increased medical and housing allowances, but disal-
lowed female members the same privilege unless their spouses were
dependent upon the income of their wives for over one-half of their
support. The Court rejected the administrative convenience test
stating that "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency, '6 7 and went on to declare that sex is a suspect
category. Because Frontiero was a plurality opinion, and because
courts tend to judge each sex-classification case on its facts, the
status of a woman's right to retain her maiden name is still in
doubt.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The equal rights amendment, 8 if ratified, may provide the
answer for a woman wishing to keep her maiden surname. The
amendment reads in part: "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." 9 Although the exact effect of this new provision
is only speculative until it is adopted and interpteted by the
courts, several writers have argued that the amendment will make
sex a suspect classification per se,11 thus giving rise to a compelling
state interest test. This would place the burden of justifying the
sex-based classification upon the state at the outset. As one such
writer stated:
" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); accord, Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971). The
California Supreme Court in holding sex to be a suspect class stated: "Sex . . . is
an immutable trait, a status into which the class members are locked by the acci-
dent of birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect classifications is
that the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society."
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
'7 Id. at 690, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
I !d.
70 E.g., Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 940 (1971).
[Vol. 79
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STUDENT NOTES
"The Equal Rights Amendment would not permit a legal re-
quirement, or even a legal presumption, that a woman takes her
husband's name at the time of marriage. In a case where a
married woman wishes to retain or regain her maiden name or
take some new name, a court would have to permit her to do so
if it would permit a man in a similar situation to keep the name
he had before marriage or change to a new name. Thus, com-
mon law and statutory rules requiring name change for the
married woman would become legal nullities."'
Another writer has suggested that where the governmental interest
in identification requires spouses to assume the same last name for
any purpose, the surname would be elected mutually without a
requirement that the woman necessarily relinquish her maiden
name. In the event that children are born to the marriage, the
surnames would be selected by the parents, allowing the use of the
mother's stirname, the father's surname, a combination of the two,
or a third name agreeable to both.2
On the other hand, passage of the equal rights amendment
may have no effect on a married woman's right to her name, de-
pending upon judicial interpretation. "Courts could obviate the
problem by declaring that there is no legally protected right to a
name."
73
VI. CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen many developments in the area of
human liberties, and many women have asserted that one such
liberty is the right to keep their maiden names upon marriage.
Historically, names were changed due to custom and choice rather
than through mandatory requirements. Similarly, today, women
who wish to adopt their husbands' surnames should continue to do
so under the informal common law procedure. Women wishing to
retain their birth-given names, however, should not be forced to
undergo the traditional marital name change.
The simplest way to remedy any misreading of the common
law would be by legislative enactment. The resulting legislation
should prescribe some procedure whereby a woman may indicate
7' Id. at 940.
n Comment, Married Woman's Right to her Maiden Name: The Possibilities
for Change, 23 BUFF. L. REv. 243, 260-61 (1973).
11 Id. at 261.
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her choice of name upon marriage. The interests of the state in
efficient administration and prevention of fraud would be pro-
tected by a requirement that any change of name at any time be
duly recorded. At present, however, no legislative action is neces-
sary in those states where judicial interpretation of the common
law has not required that a woman change her name upon mar-
riage.
Diana L. Fuller
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